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BOOK REVIEWS
THE PETITIONERS:

THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO.
By Loren Miller. New York:
Pantheon Books. 1966. Pp. xv, 461. $8.95.

It is impossible even to speculate what American legal history might
have been like, had that Dutch ship not landed in Virginia in 1619 with
chained blacks in its hold, followed somewhat later by a stream of other
vessels bearing the same pathetic cargo.
The institution of slavery became the infrastructure of the planting
economy of the South, bringing with it, almost ineluctably, the Civil
War and leaving in its wake a one-hundred-year tale of internalized

colonization and tenacious racism.
As in all societies, the planting South required a weltanschauung
supportive of its institutions. The myth of the inherent inferiority of
the black man-the societal conception of him as a thing and not a person-evolved into the philosophical sine qua non underpinning and justifying the institution of involuntary servitude. This outlook was an integral and inseparable part of the prevailing antebellum southern culture
for slaveholder and non-slaveholder alike, extending itself to a lesser degree and in modified form to the North. The sudden emancipation of
the slave from his bonds did not work a concurrent separation of the
master from his myth. For myths die hard and are prone to survive the
institutions that spawn them. So it was that the Negro was legally declared to be free but no permanent passport was issued to him to enter
the mainstream of American life.
Today the Negro is still knocking at the door. He has not been
admitted. Of late, however, as he has mustered his forces and knocked
louder, someone on the other side of the door is finally answering,
"Who's there?"
In this story of black travail the role of the Supreme Court until the
1930's, according to Loren Miller, was a very unsalutary one. The early
Court did not assail the myth of Negro inferiority but at times expressly
reaffirmed it. This is not to say that the Court always abided by the public will and simply reflected current mores. In important respects it
thwarted that will as expressed in constitutional amendments and congressional enactments. Miller's thesis is that the Supreme Court first took the
Negro under its wing. The Court became the guardian and the Negro the
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ward. When that relationship was firmly established, the guardian then
complacently informed its ward that it was helpless to protect him.
In the middle of the last century when Congress found it increasingly more difficult to reach compromises concerning slavery, the Court
was encouraged to assist. This it did. Three years before the Civil War
it declared in the Dred Scott Case' that Congress had no authority to
prohibit slavery in the territories. Moreover, a freed Negro was not a
"person" under the Constitution; therefore, although he may have been
a citizen of a particular state, he was not a citizen of the United States
with all the benefits granted to citizens under the Constitution. For the
majority of the Court, Chief Justice Taney said:
They [Negroes] had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect .
2
It took the 1954 school desegregation cases3 -almost a hundred years
later-to match the furor evoked by the Dred Scott decision.
Then came the Civil War which, according to most texts on the subject, the North supposedly won. Passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments following that conflict vested the Negro-or
so some thought-with that entire paraphernalia of rights which mark
and protect a free man in a free society. Miller sides with the body of
thought which insists the Court emasculated those amendments, severely
narrowing their sweep in an unhappy series of decisions beginning with
the Slaughter House Cases of 1873.' In these cases, Miller contends
that the Court disinterred the concept (enunciated in the Dred Scott decision) of dual state and national citizenship, a distinction which he is
convinced the fourteenth amendment had buried. The Court then virtually reduced to minor significance the concept of privileges and immunities which attach to United States citizenship. The decisive thrust
of the opinion was in these terms: it was "not the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . to transfer the security and protection of . . .
civil rights . . . from the states to the federal government. . . .
Pursuing the rationale of Slaughter House, the Court struck down
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1856).
2. Id. at 407.
3. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ;Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
4. 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
5. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS 104 (1966) [hereinafter cited as MILLER].
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the Civil Rights Act of 1875.0 That law had been passed to assure equal
enjoyment of public accommodations. But the fourteenth amendment,
the Court ruled, was inapplicable to discriminatory conduct of individuals;
it only proscribed state action. Redress of grievances could not be had
from Congress; the Negro "may presumably be vindicated by resort to
the laws of the State for redress."
To refer the Negro to the largess of southern legislatures was an
ironical jest, for within a short time after the Civil War the Negro was
not represented in those legislatures because he dared not vote. He
dared not vote because his life was imperiled. His life was imperiled
because of mob action. And the Court refused to permit Congress to
protect him against mob action. The circle was complete. It was not
until 1964 that the Negro could eat his bowl of chili in the local beanery.
Even if the Negro had the incredible temerity to brave whip, stake,
tree limb and noose, the polls-with indirect judicial sanction, Miller
notes-were effectively closed to him. The Court ruled the fifteenth
amendment did not give the Negro the right to vote; it only interdicted
state interference with that right on racial grounds. The author demonstrates what followed was perfectly predictable; a plethora of laws
calculated to keep Negroes off the voting rolls: poll taxes, literacy
tests, intricate registration statutes-the whole gamut of cynical devices
familiar to the most casual student of American history-became the
order of the day. In a two year period Negro registration in Louisiana
fell from 130,334 to 1,324, a drop of 99 percent.
From the author's vantage point, the justices were in the main concerned less with the human spirit than with a rapidly expanding economy.
Given the milieu in which they had developed and thrived prior to donning their robes, their natural proclivities were to encourage economic
growth, and shelter it, if need be, from social dislocation.
The great business and industrial need of the latter half of
the nineteenth century was for legal devices that would expedite
growth and development of corporations and free them of crippling state restrictions. Successive appointments of successful
corporate lawyers to the Court after the Civil War created a
climate of judicial opinion in which the problems of growing
business found a sympathetic audience. Slowly, subtly, but
surely, the Fourteenth Amendment was transformed into a
charter to protect economic interests, chiefly of corporations ....
6.

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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[T]he Compromise of 1876 attendant on the HayesTilden election was more than a bargain between the Democrats
and the Republicans, by which the political rule of the South
was resigned to Democratic control with a Republican warrant
to pursue nationalizing economic policies.

.

.

. It signalized

the restoration of the union on terms acceptable to the South.
The tremendously powerful judicial arm of the national government, the Supreme Court of the United States, had a vital
role to play in making the compromise effective..
[This] called for an expansive interpretation of the amendment in the area of economic interests and a restrictive interpretation in the sphere of civil rights. That is exactly what the
Court did, and we need not cry corruption or charge cynicism
to explain its actions. We need only see it in its proper historical perspective as a court of men, predominantly successful
corporation lawyers, conservative in outlook, predisposed to the
businessman's point of view, tragically mistaken but patriotic
within their lights, and convinced that the destiny of the nation
lay in giving free rein to the doctrine of laissez-faire economics.
It was as easy for these men to tolerate the evils of the burgeoning Jim Crow system as it was for the Founding Fathers
to accommodate themselves to the evils of human slavery.
And for the same reason: both had blinded their eyes with
visions of other goals.'
Against that background it is readily understandable that the Court
decided as it did in the Slaughter House and Civil Rights Cases; that it
also declared Congress could not legislate to protect the Negro against
mob violence unless that violence had been sanctioned by the state; and
that it could not protect his vote unless the state itself directly interfered
with it on racial grounds. And even then when the voting registration
statutes were rigged against the Negro, the Court would not intervene.
The Court refused to hold the complete and prolonged absence of Negroes from trial and grand juries justified the conclusion that they had
been intentionally excluded. Finally, the Court enunciated the pernicious "separate but equal doctrine"' which effectively sealed off the
Negro from the rest of the society like a pariah for half a century. The
results of that case will no doubt plague us for more than another half
century.
7. MILLER 114-16.
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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For some time now (since the Scottsboro Cases' in the early thirties,
Miller states) the Court has been steadily undoing its previous handiwork-a "judicial revolution in race relations"-which reached a crescendo in the school desegregation cases of 1954."°
The Court no longer feels bound by a state court's determination
that there was no discrimination in the selection of juries, hence reversing the trend initiated in the Slaughter House Cases that supervision of
civil rights will be left to the states. Between 1935 and 1965 the Court
heard twenty cases involving the exclusion of Negroes from juries. In
eighteen of them it found discrimination where the state trial and appellate courts had found none. Virtually every facet of Negro existence
elicited the Court's interest and protection, from the refusal to enforce
racially restrictive covenants to the right to counsel; from invalidation
of the white primary system to the refusal to permit state investigating
committees to meander through NAACP membership lists.
The techniques utilized by the Court to reverse its field were varied.
Some decisions, such as the one invalidating the white primary, were
specifically overruled. Others met a different fate. For unpublished
reasons of its own, the Court never expressly overruled Plessy v. Ferguson" which had initiated the doctrine of "separate but equal." The
Court simply immolated the credo and laid it everlastingly to rest. The
public accommodations section of the 1875 Civil Rights Act differed
little from its successor, the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The earlier act failed
when the Court refused to acknowledge that Congress was empowered
to prevent discrimination by individuals. In his approval of the recent
act, Mr. Justice Clark in his majority opinion did not trifle with that notion; he adopted an easier course and hung his judicial hat on the commerce clause.
How does Miller account for the Supreme Court's rather remarkable reversal in attitude toward the Negro? He never really confronts
this issue head on, only tangentially. He is obviously intrigued by the
reasons for the Court's attitude in the period from roughly 1857 to
1930. Yet the reversal of that attitude commands less of his attention,
and he makes only scattered references to it. In his defense, it is axiomatic that the past is much easier to read than the present. Miller does
not attribute the changing juridical tide to the composition of the Court,
for he is at pains to point out earlier in the book that the civil libertarian9.
(1935);
10.
11.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
Cases cited note 3 supra.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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ism of Holmes and Brandeis was not reflected in their judicial response
to civil rights.
Miller does allude, however, to the steady trek of the Negro from
country to city, his urbanization, the rise of the black bourgeoisie and the
strengthening of its chosen instrument, the NAACP. "Vast changes,"
he adds, "far from the ability of any man to foresee in 1930, were to
sweep over the United States, and the world, in the area of race relations,
in the swift moving decades after 1930. Old ideas perish, and new and
revolutionary concepts replace them."' 2 There is no elaboration of this
point. Perhaps the author will favor us with an extended analysis of it
in a future work.
This book is not distinguished by legal research intensely focused
on one very fine point, characteristic of much legal writing. No light,
startlingly new, is shed by the author on any one case. He borrows
liberally from the prolific material unearthed by a host of other scholars.
Yet his contribution is substantial, and the book is splendid and often
exciting reading. Miller is concerned with history's sweep and its significance to man. He does not view one case in grand isolation from the
next; nor the totality of the cases-the emergence and direction of the
law-as merely the child of rigorous logic, remote and unrelated to the
economic forces operative in society.
To his material the author brings a profound compassion. The
lowliest litigants, whose names are immortalized in some of the most
eminent cases in American jurisprudence, are treated with gentle respect.
The agonizing facts which gave rise to the litigation are described in
sympathetic detail. This is not a dull recondite tome; the exposition of
the cases is not an arid exercise. There is a human dimension to this
book. In Plessy v. Ferguson,Mr. Justice Brown wrote: "A statute which
implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races-a
distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which
must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other
race by color-has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two
races. .

.

. "" To which the author replies: "This facile generalization

entirely neglected the very obvious truth that Mr. Plessy, whose colored
blood was not discernible, was not 'distinguished from the other race'
by color."'"
Then there is Bird Gee. Who in heaven's name is he? Oh just an
escaped slave, contentious enough to be one of the prosecuting witnesses
12.
13.
14.

MILLER

260.

163 U.S. at 543.
MILLER

168.
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in the famous Civil Rights Cases of 1883 when a waiter refused to
serve him in a Kansas City restaurant. In fact, he died only a couple of
years ago. Incidentally, one of Bird Gee's grandnephews is still carrying on the tradition, a fellow named Loren Miller.
BURTON D. WECHSLERt
1"Lecturer

in law with rank of Professor,
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